🆕Abuse Domain Trust: Raisechild
Abuses an intra-forest transitive trust (child ↔ parent) to forge a Golden Ticket containing an extra SID from the other domain (e.g. Enterprise Admins). This allows authenticating to the target domain with elevated privileges.
Works child → parent and parent → child.
What it does
Detects the corresponding intra-forest trust (
trustedDomain+ inbound/bidirectional).Retrieves the local domain SID (child or parent depending on where the module is executed).
Forges a TGT and injects an extra SID from the other domain (parent or child).
Saves the ticket as
<USER>.ccache.
Windows Server 2025 disables RC4 by default — AES support in this module allows forging tickets anyway.
Important Requirements
The targeted user must exist in BOTH domains
Since modern Windows checks the user in the PAC, the username must be valid in both the source and target domain.
USER_ID must match the RID of the user in the domain where raisechild is run
USER_ID must match the RID of the user in the domain where raisechild is runExample: running the module from the child domain with user test123:
Child
test123
1111
Parent
test123
1001
You must specify:
If running from the parent, you must instead specify:
The RID must always correspond to the domain whose krbtgt key is used to forge the ticket.
Module Options
USER
User to impersonate (must exist in both domains)
Administrator
USER_ID
RID of USER in the current domain
500
RID
Extra SID RID injected from the other domain
519 (Enterprise Admins)
ETYPE
rc4 / aes128 / aes256
rc4
Usage Examples
Forge a basic Golden Ticket:
Using a specific account:
Using AES256:
Change the injected extra SID:
Using the forged ticket
Then authenticate to the target domain:

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